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Abstract 
The impact of school choice on education quality is one of the most hotly contested issues in 
education economics. We contribute to the debate by investigating the effect of concentration 
of local education markets and the number of schools in the city on the average achievements 
of 9th grade students in Polish middle schools. We find the evidence that the increased 
availability of choice leads to higher performance, although this relationship holds only until a 
certain threshold is reached. As the number of schools in the city reaches four, the marginal 
benefit from further widening of the market falls to zero, or even becomes negative. Besides 
the influence on the average achievement in the city, the increased school choice leads to 
higher differentiation among schools. In contrast to the previous result, here we do not 
observe any threshold, and the effect seems to be independent of scale.           
 
Keywords: school choice, school competition, educational quality, school differentiation 
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Introduction 
 
The impact of school choice on education quality is one of the most hotly contested 
issues in education economics. On the one hand, proponents of market-oriented mechanisms 
argue that without competition, public schools become complacent and tend to waste 
enormous resources allocated to them by the post-industrial nations. The extreme version 
holds that, in order to improve quality, public schools should be forced to compete against 
each other, and that the best way to achieve this is to introduce some form of school vouchers. 
On the other hand, researchers and practitioners alike argue that education is by nature a 
cooperative endeavor, and that promotion of quality can be achieved through introduction of 
national standards and through improvement of teacher qualifications, rather than through cut-
throat competition.  
The discussion has many dimensions of which the most visible refers to the legal and 
institutional framework governing education, especially the school finance. The two opposite 
attitudes mentioned above favor very different legal solutions and very different allocation 
systems, and the choice often becomes an important political issue at the local level, for the 
managers of local public education systems (eg. school districts in US, LES’s in UK, gminas 
in Poland). 
The crucial element of the debate is the research into school performance, because it is 
here that the hopelessly entangled social and political arguments may be clarified and some 
basic degree of consensus reached, with useful lessons for both legislation and local school 
practice. 
There are two basic and quite different types of competition which are investigated in 
empirical (mostly American) research. First, the competition from non-public, or more 
generally, selective schools. Do non public schools compete among themselves, or do they 
also drain resources and skim the best students from the public schools? Or maybe they 
provide public education system an incentive to use the resources more effectively and 
increase productivity? 
Secondly, the competition within the public school sector. Do the schools belonging to 
one school district or to one local government compete against each other? Does availability 
of choice for parents and pupils leads to better average performance of local schools? Does 
more schools necessarily means more segregation?  
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Poland is an interesting case because it allows for both types of competition. Since the 
end of communism, Poland had developed a robust if rather limited non public school sector, 
and moreover the state provides financial support to those schools at the level of per student 
expenditures in analogous public schools. The non public schools are essentially located only 
in the cities and, contrary to what can be expected, only a small proportion of them are 
confessional (Catholic). In the year 2001/2002 about 2% of students of gymnasium, the lower 
secondary school serving the grades 7 to 9, attended non public schools.  
At the same time, Poland allows the students and parents a degree of choice between 
the public schools. For municipalities with more than one public school, the city must by law 
establish school catchment areas (rejon szkolny). All students residing in the catchment area 
have the right to attend the local school (and the school must accept them), but the school may 
also accept the students from outside its catchment area, if there are places. The decision is 
taken by the school headmaster, and with the demographic decline, the availability of places 
in the schools becomes quite common. The parents and students do exercise this right of 
choice, for instance in 2001/2002 15,3% of all students attended the middle school other than 
their local one. Of course, this migration between neighboring catchment areas is severely 
limited in rural areas, partly due to distances involved and absence of convenient 
transportation, and partly to lower interest of the parents in obtaining good education for their 
children in rural areas. Thus, in the cities3 the share of students attending the school outside 
the official catchment area is higher than national average, namely  17,8% . In Polish context 
it seems therefore reasonable to restrict the analysis of school choice to the urbanized areas.  
Apart from inter-catchment area migration of students, we need also consider the inter-
municipal migration. Here it is important to understand that Polish household, unlike, for 
example,  the American ones, move very rarely, and only in exceptional cases would such a 
move be related to search for a good school. However, the parents can and do send their 
children to schools in another municipality. Usually, this involves the migration of children 
from villages to urban schools, but not only. Among the 360 cities with only one middle 
school available in 2002, on average 6,5% of pupils did not attend this unique facility, and 
had to attend the school in another municipality. However the competition of municipalities 
for students is still an unrecognized phenomenon.  
                                                
3
 Polish primary and lower secondary education is fully decentralized to nearly 2,500 municipalities (gminas), 
see Levitas, Herczyski (2002). Of them, about 1,600 are rural, 300 are urban and the remaining ones are mixed, 
comprising both a city and surrounding villages. In the present paper by cities we mean any municipality which 
is either urban or includes an urban area as its center. In 2002, Poland had  895 cities.  
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Another good reason to study Polish experience is the availability of uniform, 
nationally administered test of student achievements. Since the introduction of those tests in 
2002, it is possible to examine the impact of availability of choice among public schools on 
education attainment of students.   
In studying school choice, it is necessary to consider what competition in the 
education sector may mean. It seems that three necessary conditions must be fulfilled so that 
local educational market could be described as offering choice, or competitive. First, parents 
and pupils need to be able to choose between different schools in the municipality. This 
means not only that such choice should be allowed by the regulations, but there need also 
exist real schools to choose between. This is indeed the case in most Polish cities.  
Second, instructional quality (real or perceived, based on rumors or on past student 
achievements) should be considered by parents an important criterion for school selection. 
That is, for example, they have to be willing to choose better school even if there are other 
facilities located closer to their home. We may consider a simple model of school choice 
made by parents and/or pupils, where the weight ip  ( 10 << ip ) is attributed to the distance 
from home to school by the family i, and the weight ip−1  reflects the importance of school 
quality measure, so that: 
 
jijiiji qpdps ∗−+∗= )1(  
 
where sij is family i’s overall rank of school j, dij is the inverse distance (appropriately 
normalized) from school j to family i’s home and qj is some measure of school quality. If 
average p for the municipality is large, students will in general attend the closest school, and 
the competition effect is negligible. For local educational market to be competitive, average p 
should to be small enough to put schools under the pressure of Thiebout-type sorting of 
students. It is worth noting that this model assumes d to be exogenous (fixed), so that families 
do not move to the neighborhoods where good schools are located, but are only allowed to 
send children to the schools in other districts. Such assumption naturally reduces the potential 
competitiveness of the market, but corresponds better to Polish reality. Indeed the mobility of 
population in Poland is very low as compared to that of U.S., where most of the research on 
educational markets competition are conducted. On the other hand, it is relatively easier for 
Polish students to choose to attend any school in the municipality, subject only to availability 
of places and to the decision by the school head.  
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Finally, if schools are to compete, their ‘utility’ should be directly or indirectly related 
to their ability to attract pupils. Otherwise there would be no incentive to improve 
instructional quality and other school characteristics. It is however hard to evaluate to what 
extent this condition is fulfilled in Polish reality with respect to gymnasia, the subject of the 
present article. The gymnasia are administered by local municipal authorities, responsible for 
setting school budgets (in particular, for establishing employment levels), as well as for hiring 
school headmasters. Obviously, one of the criteria for evaluating the work of headmaster 
refers to student achievements. However, no standardized system of school evaluation by the 
municipal authorities exists. Some of them may attach more importance to average 
achievements, other to holding budget discipline or reintegration of disadvantaged pupils. It 
would be wrong to say that the system of school financing rewards education quality in any 
standardized way. Local authorities obtain so called education subvention (block grant) from 
the central government. This subvention is based on weighted students, taking into account 
both the actual number of physical pupils in a given area, and the number of those belonging 
to some ‘special’ categories, such as handicapped pupils, students attending rural schools and 
so on. Thus, during the allocation of education block grant from the central to local 
governments, the funds follow the pupils, creating a basis for competitive market. However, 
apart for a few rather exceptional cities such as Kwidzyn and Swidnik, see Herczyski, 
Kiersztyn (2005), no such direct relationship exists between allocation of funds to individual 
schools and their enrollment. Usually, school budgets are determined on the historical basis 
(with incremental adaptations), or by some informal procedures. Thus usually the funding 
does not promote competitive market mechanisms.   
In sum, of the three conditions necessary for the competition on local education 
market, two seem to be at least partially satisfied. Poland has 528 cities (out of nearly 9 
hundred) with more than one lower secondary school, so they were offering parents some 
possibility of choice. Also, parents and pupils do exploit this possibility and make their 
choices felt. Of certain doubt is a competitive character of school financing system, that 
depends to large extent on local policies.  
  
Empirical literature review  
 
 Most of the research on the competition in educational markets is focused on high 
schools, rather than elementary or middle tiers of education. This is because the 
competitiveness of educational market is expected to increase along with the age of students. 
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The mobility of children attending elementary schools in response to the perceived 
differences in school quality is limited, as distance to school plays crucial role in parents’ 
choices. As children grow, parents become more willing to consider further school locations 
in the search for higher instructional quality.  
 In empirical estimations a pressure from private schools is usually proxied by the 
percent of pupils attending those schools measured at the level of administrative unit, e.g. 
county. If competition is to exert positive influence on educational quality, the increase in 
private schooling should improve the performance of public schools in the neighborhood. 
However, as explained by Dee (1998), this reasoning has two weaknesses if considered 
literarily. One concerns the existence of omitted variables bias. The demand for private 
schooling is affected by several dimensions of SES that are themselves correlated with student 
achievement. Thus, the impact of competition may be easily overestimated, as private schools 
are more common in the areas of higher SES. To avoid the bias, good control for parents SES 
is needed.  
A second problem is that the demand for private schooling is not independent on the 
quality of public schools. The better public schools are, the lower is the incentive to send 
children to private schools. This in turn may lead to underestimation of the role competition 
exerts on educational quality. To solve this problem, some American researchers applied 
instrumental variables (2SLS) approach instead of simple OLS, introducing the population 
concentration of Catholics as an additional instrument for the percent of pupils in private 
schools. They used a fact that large part of U.S. non-public schools are Catholic which 
implies it is easier and less expensive to set up private school in the area with large share of 
Catholics in the population. At the same time there is no direct link between religion and 
school achievements, which makes the share of Catholics in local population a valid 
instrument for private school competition.  
Following this approach Hoxby (1994a) demonstrated that greater private school 
competitiveness significantly raised the quality of public schools, as measured by the 
educational attainment, wages and graduation rates. In addition it is shown that, in reaction to 
the pressure from private sector, public schools increase teacher salaries.  
Dee (1998) uses data on 4488 school districts in 18 states of USA. He shows that the 
presence of nonpublic high schools in a district improves the grade completion rate in public 
education. As the share of private school pupils increases by ten percentage points, the 
completion rate in public schools raises by 2,5 point.  
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The effect of private competition on public schools estimated in the research of Greene 
and Kang (2004) is not that clear. They examine database on high school districts in New 
York State, outside New York City, for the school years 1989/1990 to 1992/1993. Private 
competition shows positive effect on average performance at the math and science Regent 
examinations (calculated as the number of pupils passing the exam divided by the average 
enrollment in grade 9-12) and negative effect on dropout rates until the percentage in private 
schools exceeds 7,6% and 26,3% respectively. The average value of private percentage in the 
sample is 7,3% and maximum value is 22,7%. In contrast, the percentage of private 
enrollment has negative impact on the percent of students receiving a high quality statewide 
Regents diploma. The negative effect reveals as the private enrollment exceeds only 1,1% of 
total enrollment in a county. 
The undesired effects of the competition between selective and non-selective schools 
are demonstrated also by Dee and Fu (2004). Their research concerns the impact of charter 
schools in Arizona and neighboring states. It relies on panel based evaluations using data from 
1994/1995 and 1999/2000 school years. The results suggest that the introduction of charter 
schools skimmed white non-Hispanic student and lowered the amount of resources available 
to conventional public schools. 
Beside the interactions between private and public schools, some research investigate 
the effects of competition within public sector or simply the implications of easier choice 
among schools, without distinguishing the sectors or organizational forms. The usual measure 
of the competitiveness of local education market applied in U.S. research is Herfindahl index 
of market concentration. It can be defined as 
=
=
n
j ji pH 1
2
, where jp  is relative enrollment 
in school j, so that 
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j
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p = , with jE  being actual enrollment in school j, and 

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n
j ji EE 1 being total student enrollment in the area i (n is the number of schools).  
Interestingly, in the American research H is usually calculated at county level (‘j’ refers to the 
counties) with ‘i’ referring to school districts, so that the index measures the competitiveness 
between school districts rather than among individual schools. Alternatively, the strength of 
competition is measured by the number of competitors (school, districts) in a given 
administrative unit or, if the research is conducted at school level, as a distance from a given 
school to it’s closest competitors. 
 Hoxby (1994b) applies instrumental variables technique to isolate the exogenous 
variation of Herfindahl index of school district concentration among metropolitan areas of 
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U.S. She derives instruments from natural boundaries (rivers) that partially determine district 
size. Then she proves that variation in H has strong influence on school functioning. As she 
concludes, easier choice leads to greater productivity. Areas with more opportunities for 
school choice have lower per student costs, lower teacher salaries and larger class size . The 
same areas have better average student achievements, as measured by test scores and 
attainment rates. Finally, Hoxby finds strong evidence that in areas with higher competition 
among public schools a smaller share of students attend private schools. 
 Zanzig (1997) measures the competitiveness of educational market by Herfindahl 
index of school district concentration and, alternatively, number of districts per county. The 
author explains that as additional districts are added comparison among them becomes easier, 
resulting in more effective parental monitoring and thus higher test scores. At some point 
however, the benefit of additional district is expected to become negligible and more 
competition has no effect on achievements. At this point local educational market is said to be 
completely competitive. Zanzig use 1970 data for California school districts. Instead of 
assuming any functional form of competition effect on performance, the author splits the 
number of districts and Herindahl index into four variables: District1-M, DistrictM+, 
Herfindahl 0-N and Herfindahl N+, where M and N are ‘critical levels’ of districts number 
and H, respectively. It is expected that additional district will have positive, significant impact 
on achievements only below threshold number M and above critical value N of Herfindahl 
index. Critical values are then found by repeating regressions with different values of N and 
M until the obtained statistics match the assumed pattern.. The results of the research reveal 
that only three to five districts are needed to achieve a completely competitive educational 
market.  
As noted by Bradley, Johnes and Millington (2001), in England parental choice 
matters to schools because their funding is driven by pupil numbers. Each Local Education 
Authority has designed a formula for the funding of schools within its jurisdiction. These 
formulae, approved by central government, are based mainly on the age-weighted number of 
students in each school. UK has therefore a quasi voucher scheme for both primary and 
secondary education. Millington and Bradley (1998) showed that greater degree of 
competition between non-selective (public) schools improved average school performance. 
They also demonstrated a cream-skimming effect of non-public schooling as the presence of 
selective schools in the catchments area of a non-selective school depressed the achievements 
of the latter.  
 10
Bradley, Johnes and Millington (2001) emphasize that schools have multiple outputs, 
not only exam performance. They apply DEA (Data Envelopment Analysis) to capture this 
multi-product nature of schools and assume what school maximizes is the weighted sum of 
products instead of one measure of performance. They find that non-selective (public) school 
efficiency depends positively on the number of competitors (other non-selective schools) in 
the proximity. It also depends negatively on the distance between competing schools as the 
regression coefficient referring to competitors located within 1 km radius is six times greater 
than the one for schools between 3 and 5 km away. In contrast to earlier research by 
Millington and Bradley (1998), this time the authors find little systematic evidence that cream 
skimming by selective (non-public) schools reduces the efficiency of non-selective schools. 
Although the respective coefficients are negative, the are generally insignificant.  
 Finally, in one of the recent papers Greene and Kang (2004) examine database on high 
school districts in New York State (outside New York city) for the school years 1989/1990 to 
1992/1993. They use quadratic specification of Herfindahl index and find unambiguously 
positive impact of competition on school performance. As the Herfindahl index rises, the 
average district score of math and science Regent examinations drops significantly. This 
happens until the index reaches 0.28, and only 3,5% of the observations posses an index 
greater than this. Moreover, public competition has a significant negative effect on dropout 
rate over the entire sample range. 
 
 
Conceptual framework and data 
 
What may be the consequences of increased competition among schools? Hoxby (1994b) 
speaks about three theoretically possible effects: 
 
i) More competition should force schools into higher productivity and lead to higher 
average student achievements  
ii) Easier choice between schools leads to increased sorting of students. This may be 
undesired if advantaged students gain at the expense of disadvantaged ones. 
iii) Higher competition among public schools gives parents less incentive to send 
children to private schools 
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In this paper we focus on verifying the first two effects. We do not distinguish 
between private and public schools, but rather investigate how the availability of choice 
among schools affects the average performance and the inequality of achievements among 
different schools in a given area. Although the impact of private competition on public 
schooling is an important topic that appears in many works on education markets, it would be 
very difficult to adapt those works to Polish conditions. The main problem refers to 
endogeneity of a demand for private schooling. As explained in the previous section this 
demand is partially determined by the performance of public schools in the neighborhood. 
Differently than with American data, for Poland the problem cannot be solved by using 
instrumental variables related to religious structure of the local population. First, over 90% or 
Poles consider themselves as Catholics and the variation of such variable among localities 
would be very small. Even more importantly, only a small fraction of Polish private schools 
are religious schools. This makes religion completely useless as an instrument for private 
education measure.  
Addressing the first of the problems listed above, we estimate the model of school 
performance using as dependent variable the city’s average test score in mathematics and 
science achieved by 9th grade students of lower secondary schools. In further part of the 
analysis we change the dependent variable to the inter-school standard deviation of the 
average test score, measuring the differentiation among schools within a city. We focus on 
middle schools, because it is the highest tier of public education in Poland, for which a 
standardized, externally evaluated tests are conducted at the final grade. Such tests are to be 
applied in higher schools only since 2005. 
The sample covers all Polish municipalities including a city, that is, all purely rural 
municipalities, of which vast majority maintain only one middle school, are excluded. This 
makes over 800 out of total number of 2500 municipalities left for the analysis. About 300 of 
them are simply larger or smaller cities, and the rest can be described as mixed rural-urban 
units, consisting of the city and surrounding rural area. For simplicity, wherever a term ‘city’ 
is used in this article, it refers to the city or mixed rural-urban municipality.   
We consider the following simple model of educational performance:         
 
where Qi is the average student achievement in municipality ‘i’ (average test score in 
mathematics and science), fi states for the average level of family education, ri refers too 
),,( iiii crfQQ =
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city’s average level of school resources and ci measures the availability of  school choice. In 
further analysis the model takes the following general form:   
 
so that instead of average performance we model the differentiation of student achievements 
among schools, as measured by inter-school standard deviation of the test score: 

=
−=
n
j iji QQnV 1
2)(1 , where Qj refers to the average test score in school j, and n is the 
number of schools in a city.   
For both dependent variables, the source of data is Centralna Komisja Egzaminacyjna 
(CEC, Central Examination Commission), administering the externally evaluated school tests. 
We use the data from academic year 2001/2002. 
The level of family education is approximated at city level by the average years of 
schooling in adult population. The data come from national census conducted in 2002 by the 
Central Statistical Office (CSO). 
The variables expressing the level of school resources used in our analysis are: average 
teacher salary, average non-teacher school employee’s salary and average class size. Former 
two were taken from 2001 obligatory report EN-3, prepared by the schools. The latter comes 
from the 2002/2002 S02 database on schools. Both EN-3 and S02 reports are designed by 
Polish Ministry of Education and Sports and administered by CSO.  
The control variable of city population number in 2001 is taken from Regional Data 
Bank, maintained by CSO.   
Finally, the availability of school choice is approximated in two ways. First, a Herfindahl 
index of city education market concentration is calculated as 
=
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, where Ej is 
enrollment in school j and Ei is total enrollment in all city schools. A city with only one lower 
secondary school (fully concentrated market) will be assigned H=1. If there are two middle 
schools of equal size, the index will be equal to 0,5, and so on.  
Another variable reflecting the availability of school choice is simply the number of 
schools in a city, applied in the specification as a set of dummies, each indicating certain 
quantity of schools, from one to six, with the last variable accounting for the cities maintaing 
seven or more schools. The data on school enrollment and the number of schools in 
2001/2002 are taken from S02 database.           
),,(V iiii crfQ=
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The descriptive statistics for all the variables used in the analysis are presented in 
Table 1.  
(Table 1 here)     
 
 
Results 
 
As discussed above, we use two measures of public school choice available to 
students: the Herfindahl index of school concentration, and the number of public schools in a 
given local (municipal) school system. The equations in Table 2 provide estimates of impact 
of those two measures on student achievements on mathematical and scientific part of tests 
administered in 2002 to graduates of gymnasia (lower secondary schools) in Poland. Average 
salaries of teachers, and non-teacher school employees, average years of schooling in adult 
population, average class size and city population are used as control variables of the model.  
 
(Table 2 here) 
 
We note that the Herfindahl index has a significant and negative impact on student 
achievement. The greater the choice of public schools, as measured by lower Herfindahl 
index, the higher the test results. However, one may suspect that this result is mainly due to 
the difference between cities with only one gymnasium and those with more than one (over 
41% of Polish cities have only one, they are often smaller and poorer cities). This is directly 
related to the nature of Herfindahl index. For single school municipalities H is naturally equal 
to 1, meaning absolute concentration of education market and no choice available for the 
children and parents (attending middle school outside home municipality is very rare). If 
instead of one school, two smaller, equally sized facilities were established, the Herfindahl 
index would rather dramatically drop to 0,5. Creating further schools however would have 
much smaller effect on H. It is therefore possible, that high statistical significance of the index 
reflects only the gap in educational quality between smallest (one school) education systems 
and the more complex ones, saying little about how school choice affects the quality within 
the group of larger cities, where variation in H is much lower. In order to check this, in 
Equation 2 the sample is restricted to the municipalities with more than one school. We can 
see that even in this restricted sample the negative impact of Herfindahl index is significant 
and negative. Moreover, the regression coefficient by H is even higher for multi-school 
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municipalities than for unrestricted sample. Assuming linear relationship between H and 
education performance, the coefficient close to -0,12 (Equation 1) suggests that of two 
hypothetical municipalities similarly endowed with human capital and school resources, the 
one with two equally sized middle schools would achieve the average test score about 6% 
higher than the one with single school. In turn, three school system would be by 2,4% more 
effective than two-school one. This is a very significant impact.   
A more detailed results on the effects of school choice on student performance are 
provided by Equation 3, where, instead of Herfindahl index we use the measure of the number 
of middle schools in a municipality. We note that the student achievement grows as the 
number of schools increases to four, and then stabilizes (the further variables are still 
significant, but the coefficients are lower than by for ‘four school’ dummy.) This suggests, 
that although the policy of creating very large schools, often serving the whole local student 
population, does not lead to best examination outcomes, the availability of choice improves 
students results only till certain number of schools is reached. The estimated coefficients 
indicate that local education market with four or five lower secondary schools is already 
sufficiently competitive.  
One important issue here is that in large cities, those with many gymnasia, there may 
be some additional factors that tend to improve student learning chances, such as greater 
availability of out of school education resources. This is partially but not completely 
accounted for by the use of the parental education level (proxied by average years of 
schooling received by the adult population of the city). That is, the impact of school choice on 
student performance might be overestimated. Although there is no direct correlation between 
student test score and city population (coefficient equal to 0,03), we decided to include the 
latter variable as a control factor in all three equations. Interestingly, the population size 
shows significant and negative impact on average school outcome, indicating that, at least for 
school achievements in mathematics and science, the hypothetical advantage of large cities 
may be related to family education or teaching quality, but rather not to wider benefits of 
living in metropolis. On the contrary, social pathologies of large cities may have a stronger 
influence than additional education resources.   
 Increased choice available to students of public schools, as measured either by school 
concentration or by the number of schools in a given city, is associated with higher student 
achievement, when the relevant social factors, such as education level of adult population, are 
controlled. The exact way through which this influence arises is an important open problem. 
However, we do know that this is not related to the number of students actually exploiting the 
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opportunity of increased school choice, that is students who decided to attend a gymnasium 
which is not their local school4. We know, indeed, that this share of migrating students, is not 
correlated with the average student achievement at municipal level. Thus if there is a pressure 
on the schools to operate more efficiently and to provide better education for their students, 
this pressure is not induced by the students voting with their feet. The actual mechanism of 
how choice influences quality is therefore more complex.  
Besides the effect on average school productivity, the other frequently discussed result 
of school choice availability is sorting of students. Differently than increased average 
performance this is rather undesired and provide arguments for the opponents of competition 
on the education market. 
In the specifications presented in Table 3, we use a crude measure of differentiation of 
average school achievement within a municipality, namely the standard deviation of school 
level scores, that is a measure indicating how the local schools differ between them in their 
average test results.  
 
(Table 3 here) 
 
The results of Equations 4 and 5 are in stark contrast to the estimates presented in 
Table2. We note that neither the average teacher or non teacher salaries, nor education level 
of the parents, have significant impact on how the schools differ from each other. However, 
Herfindahl index significantly and negatively influences the standard deviation of school 
averages. This means that if more school choice is available, the schools will become more 
different. That is a strong endorsement of a prediction made on theoretical grounds by Hoxby 
(1994b), as described earlier in this article.  
Even more interesting is equation 5, where in place of Herfindahl index we use the 
number of schools. As we can see, the larger the number of schools, the greater the 
differentiation between them. However, unlike the marginal average achievement (see 
Equation 3, Table 2), the marginal differentiation, that is the increase of standard deviation as 
a result of adding one additional school, remains strictly positive for any number of schools. 
Table 2 allowed us to conclude that local school market system becomes fully ‘saturated’ as 
the number of gymnasia reaches four, and that adding more schools will not improve the 
                                                
4
 As described in the introductory part, in Poland each school is assigned a district to cover. The school is 
obliged to accept the application of a student leaving in it’s district, however students are allowed to choose a 
school outside a district.  
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average student test scores. In contrast, the more schools there are, the higher is the 
differentiation among them, and this relationship does not seem to weaken as education 
market grows.  
 
Results discussion and conclusions 
 
We have reviewed the evidence from Polish cities about the impact of school choice 
on student achievement. The findings are generally in agreement with the theoretical 
predictions and empirical results reached in a very different social and political context by 
Hoxby (1994b), Zanzig (1997), Bradley, Johnes and Millington (2001) or Greene and Kang 
(2004), namely that greater choice among public schools contributes both to the increase of 
average student achievement (average in the city) and to heightened differences between the 
schools (as measured by standard deviation of school averages). Interestingly, the impact on 
average student achievement has a threshold, and as the number of gymnasia reaches four, the 
marginal effect of competition on student performance becomes insignificant and additional 
schools do not contribute to further increase of student test results. The school differentiation, 
in contrast, becomes more and more pronounced with every added facility.  
Do these results imply that the observed increase in average school productivity is 
really a consequence of competition for students? Certainly, there is no easy answer to this 
question. One may argue that such market oriented interpretation does not reflect the realities 
of local education systems in Poland. Schools do not really compete with each other, and if 
they did, this would not be for students, but rather for additional resources from the city, their 
owner and the provider of their budgets. However, in allocating the funds to schools city 
officials must take into account, though not always directly or exclusively, the number of 
students. Thus the competition for resources becomes in fact competition for pupils, even if 
the economic (market) nature of this competition remains unrealized by the headmasters.  
A strong motivation to improve education quality may be provided by the fear of 
school closures. In the face of demographic decline, present in Polish education for over 3 
years now and set to continue for many more years, the schools do compete for the chance to 
stay open, to avoid closures. Indeed, it seems that in the few Polish cities, such as Swidnik 
and Kwidzyn, which did introduce a voucher-type funding scheme (setting the schools 
budgets proportional to enrollment, and letting schools compete directly for students), the 
vouchers had little effect until the demographic decline came, and then produced amazingly 
intense competition for each additional student, largely in the effort to stay in business (see 
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Herczyski, Kiersztyn 2005). While in most Polish cities no such cut-throat competition takes 
place, the school directors are aware that with decreasing student numbers some decisions 
about school closures will have to be taken. Now, when a local school system is dominated by 
a few relatively large schools, the motivation to improve teaching methods is very weak, both 
in the large schools, which know they will continue to operate, and in the small schools which 
have little hope of staying open for very long. In more deconcentrated systems, and in systems 
with many schools, cities have more freedom in deciding which facilities to close, and the 
schools run more equal risk of being chosen for the axe. So all school directors are strongly 
motivated to improve the test results of their students, and to prove thus that their schools 
have a good right to stay in business.   
From the point of view of the parents and pupils, availability of more schools means 
more choice and therefore better chance of finding a school matching their specific needs. 
Thus, the observed positive impact of school choice on average performance should not be a 
surprise. Nevertheless, the number of schools parents are able to monitor, visit and compare 
before making decision where to send their children is clearly limited. At a certain point 
having one more option will not help them make the optimal choice, but rather increase the 
informational noise they have to filter and analyze. If we accept the idea that the positive 
effect of school number on city’s average educational performance is mainly due to the 
increased possibility of choice for the parents and pupils, then our research suggests that the 
number of options the parents are able to consider is four, since fifth school in the 
municipality is the first that doesn’t improve the average student achievements. 
An alternative explanation of our results, although not contradictory to the above,  is 
related to the role of city administration and it’s managerial power over local education 
system, rather than to the competition among schools or to greater choice for parents. With 
few schools, or with the local system dominated by one very large school, the chances for 
dialogue and discussions, between the city education department and the school headmasters 
are limited, and will be influenced by one or two loud voices. Unless those voices belong to 
very reasonable and open minded school headmasters, the city will be making less then 
optimal decisions about where to allocate scarce resources, how to react to the difficulties of 
particular schools, or how to monitor and assess school performance. With less concentration, 
and more schools, the relative position of the city education department becomes stronger and 
the management of the sector may be more focused on ensuring quality for all students. On 
the other hand, it is obvious that managing large system, consisting of many schools is more 
difficult and reduces the possibility of direct supervision over the activity of particular 
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schools. Thus, as the number of schools exceeds a certain threshold, the negative scale effects 
of the system may offset the benefits from the strong managerial position of city education 
department. Again, our results suggest that such threshold is equal to about four schools.  
Turning back to the competitive pressure put on schools, we can propose two 
mechanisms through which schools adapt to this pressure. Again, these are not contradictory, 
but rather coexisting strategies. First, in the presence of competition schools may concentrate 
on enhancing their teaching quality and learning conditions which should result in improving 
the average performance, as observed in our research. At the same time however, the more 
schools operate in a given area, the more attractive it becomes for them to adapt their 
pedagogical offer to specific groups of students, instead of simply competing in test results. 
As a consequence, deconcentration of local educational market leads to differentiation of 
schools in terms of student achievements. This interpretation is supported by our consistent 
finding of the impact of Herfindahl index, measuring exactly market concentration, on inter- 
school standard deviation within a city. Also the number of schools shows an increasing 
positive effect on the differentiation of average schools test scores.  
 Although we offered here several possible interpretations of the obtained results, the 
precise mechanisms through which the availability of more schools, and deconcentration of 
educational market influence student performance remain an open question. To complicate it 
even more, we conclude by stressing that our discussions centered on issues of quality and on 
student achievements, and ignored completely the problems of the costs of providing 
education. The findings of our paper touch the dilemma of either pursuing the school quality 
though better student outcomes, or rationalizing the school operations through consolidation 
and closure of small schools. Indeed, the advice to maintain a minimum number of schools 
will in many cases mean the advice to maintain small schools, that is schools with relatively 
large per student expenditures. Formulation of a successful policy with respect to local school 
systems, which will include both shrewd financial management and the pursuit of excellence, 
remains a challenge.  
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
Variable N Mean  Minimum Maximum  Std. Dev 
Log of average math&science test score 867 3,302 2,981 3,726 0,124 
Log of city population  894 9,751 7,151 13,697 0,917 
Herfindahl index 881 0,653 0,024 1,000 0,317 
Log of average teacher salary 891 10,073 8,644 10,822 0,136 
Log of average non teacher salary 838 9,572 8,266 10,430 0,204 
Average class size 894 25,218 16,000 32,667 1,991 
Average years of schooling in adult population 895 9,972 8,878 12,961 0,639 
Inter-school standard deviation of the test score 552 3,637 0,001 15,531 2,447 
Number of middle schools 866 3,428 1,000 69,000 5,644 
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Table 2. Impact of school choice on the log of average math&science test score 
Variable Equation 1 2 3  
Constant 3,611 (10,3) 3,552 (6,94) 3,486 (9,53)   
Log of teacher salary -0,049 (-1,49) -0,048 (-1,03) -0,060 (-1,80)   
Log of non teacher salary -0,015 (-0,71) 0,002 (0,07) -0,011 (-0,53)   
Average class size 0,004 (1,80) 0,005 (2,03) 0,003 (1,30)   
Average years of schooling  0,071 (9,45) 0,069 (8,22) 0,067 (9,35)   
Log city population -0,041 (-4,84) -0,051 (-4,74) -0,023 (-2,51)   
H index -0,116 (-5,21) -0,180 (-4,18)     
2 schools     0,011 (0,82)   
3 schools     0,040 (2,71)   
4 schools     0,053 (3,02)   
5 schools     0,051 (2,42)   
6 schools     0,041 (1,82)   
More than 6 schools     0,047 (1,94)   
Selection criteria Urbanized areas 
(municipalities) 
Urbanized areas 
(municipalities) with 
more than one school 
Urbanized areas 
(municipalities) 
 
F(r,df) 21,54 (6,794) 13,5 (6,480) 10,53 (11,797)   
R2 0,14  0,14  0,13    
N 801  487  809    
Heteroscedasticity adjusted t-statistics are reported in parentheses 
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Table 3. Impact of school choice on interschool standard deviation of score 
Variable Equation 4 5 
Constant 13,57 (1,33) 13,66 (1,40) 
Log of teacher salary -1,057 (-1,22) -0,890 (-1,09) 
Log of non teacher salary -0,177 (-0,27) -0,096 (-0,16) 
Average class size 0,007 (0,12) 0,076 (1,22) 
Average years of schooling  0,377 (1,71) 0,257 (1,29) 
Log of population  -0,041 (-0,18) -0,749 (-3,16) 
H index -2,393 (-2,48)   
3 schools   0,855 (3,06) 
4 schools   1,487 (4,22) 
5 schools   1,853 (4,48) 
6 schools   2,303 (4,65) 
More than 6 schools   3,302 (6,66) 
Selection criteria Urbanized areas 
(municipalities) with 
more than one school 
Urbanized areas 
(municipalities) with more 
than one school 
F(r,df) 4,42 (6,465) 6,618 (10,461) 
R2 0,05  0,13  
N 472  472  
Heteroscedasticity adjusted t-statistics are reported in parentheses 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
